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Party and Primary Competition in
Kentucky State Legislative Races
By

MALCOLM E. JEwELL*

Kentucky is a border state in the political as well as the
geographical sense. It has neither the strongly competitive twoparty system found in some northern states nor the one-party
system characteristic of the South. Since the Civil War the state
has voted for a Republican presidential candidate only four
times." It has had only five Republican governors, serving a total
of twenty years.2 The Republican party has never had a majority
in both branches of the state legislature and only twice in one
branch.' In recent years the Republicans have held about onefourth of the seats in the legislature.
Clearly Kentucky politics is dominated by one party but not
to the total exclusion of the second. How much two-party competition is there within the various parts of the state? Professor
J. B. Shannon has calculated that 59 of the state's 120 counties
voted always or nearly always for the same party in presidential
races from 1868 through 1956. 4 But more information is needed
about local elections in order to measure party competition
adequately. In Kentucky and other states dominated by one
party it is often asserted that primaries in the major party provide an adequate substitution for two-party competition. While
vigorous contests in the Democratic gubernatorial primary are
a familiar feature of Kentucky politics, less is known about the
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Kentucky.
1

In 1896, 1924, 1928, and 1956. Shannon & McQuown, Presidential Politics
in Kentucky,
1824-1948 (1950); Kentucky Government Directory (1958).
2
Republican governors were elected in 1895, 1907, 1919, 1927, and 1943.
In the disputed 1899 election a Republican was elected but the verdict was
challenged in the legislature by his opponent. After the Democratic contender
had been assassinated, the Republican Governor fled the state and the Democratic
Lieutenant Governor took office as Governor. Shannon & McQuown, op. cit., Supra
note 1, at 68, 74, 82, 96, 122.
3 TheR epublicans won the House of Representatives in 1895 and 1919.

Shannon, "The Political Process in Kentucky," 455 Ky. L. J. 430 (1957).
4 Id. at 431-32.
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degree and character of primary competition in both parties for
lesser offices.
This is a study of two-party and primary competition in the
six elections for the Kentucky House of Representatives from
1947 through 1957. It seeks to determine how much two-party
competition there has been, to find the most competitive districts, to suggest what factors cause variations, and to make a
similar analysis of competition in both party primaries. This
study should provide information about the local organizational
strength of the two parties in various districts where House members are chosen. Since legislative behavior is influenced by the
legislator's sense of responsibility to the voter and his concern
about re-election this study should shed some light on the
legislature.
This analysis of state legislative races has significance beyond the borders of Kentucky. Venturing into a long-neglected
area, political scientists have recently studied party and primary
competition for legislative seats in several other states. Their
conclusions, not always unanimous, can be compared to the
findings in Kentucky. By such small steps, progress can be
achieved in the laborious process of creating a science of American state politics.
It is unrealistic to expect an election turnover or even close
contests in most districts every two years. To gain a better
perspective on legislative races, six consecutive, recent elections
have been chosen for analysis. The House has been selected,
rather than the Senate, because it provides a larger sample of

districts, each small enough to permit isolation of those factors
influencing competition. In the House, a few metropolitan
counties are divided into two or more districts; other districts

consist of one or two counties. 5
PARY COMPE=TION

Only 243 of the 600 elections (40.5 percent) from 1947
through 1957 were contested by both parties. The Democrats
5 Information on voting in the forty-two county districts the only ones required to file information with the state, was gathered in the Secretary of State's
office in Frankfort. Most of the information on other districts came from the
Louisville Courier-Journal and the Lexington Herald. Gaps in the newspaper
coverage of election returns were filled by correspondence with county clerks,
whose assistance in completing the compilation is appreciated.
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won 280 seats (46.7 percent) without opposition, and the Republicans won seventy-seven seats (12.8 percent) unopposed.
These figures show a comparatively low degree of competition
and suggest that in many districts one party has little or no
effective organization.6 Despite Democratic dominance at the
state level, there are substantial areas where that party is too
weak to run a candidate for the legislature. V. 0. Key has suggested that the growth of the primaries has tended to make the
majority primary in any district the center of competition
eventually weakening the minority party as it loses its function
of choosing candidates.7 In keeping with this theory, Kentucky
does have a compulsory primary, frequent primary contests, and
a relatively low proportion of contested legislative elections.
It is probably more meaningful to analyze electoral competition by districts. In 87 of the 100 House districts, one party
won six consecutive elections. In six of the remaining thirteen
districts one party won five of the six elections, usually losing
after a tight primary race in the majority party, while the minority
did not always have a candidate in every race. In the other
seven there was more frequent party turnover. Among the 87
districts always won by one party, there were only twelve in
which the losing party always ran a candidate; nine of these
were districts won by Democrats. The 25 districts in which
there was either some turnover between parties during the period
or two-party competition in every election (or both) may be
classified together as the most competitive and will be referred
to hereafter as two-party districts.
The remaining 75 districts, to be referred to as one-party,
are divided into three categories: those with frequent two-party
competition (three, four, or five times out of six), those with
occasional two-party competition (once or twice), and those in
which only one party ever ran a candidate. The numbers of
districts in the respective groups are 20, 26, and 29. The num0 Studies of other states have shown a lower percentage of uncontested
seats: Connecticut and Indiana, 5 per cent; New York, 13 per cent; Ohio, 19
percent; Missouri, 21 per cent; and Iowa, 81 per cent. With the possible exception
of Iowa, however, these states have closer two-party competition at the state level
than Kentucky. Key, American State Politics 190 (1956). In one state usually
dominated by a single party, New Ham pshire, 59 per cent of the legislative
seats were found to be uncontested. Lockard, New England State Politics 56
(1959).
7 Key, op. cit., Supra note 6, at 169-96.
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bers of Democratic districts are respectively 16, 19, and 24.
Obviously the last category, in which during six elections only
one party ran a candidate, represents the most extreme example
of one-party districts. Party competition was nearly as feeble,
however, in most of the districts where the minority party ran
a candidate once or twice. In half of those districts the minority
party never had more than 30 percent of the vote; in most of
them it never had more than 40 percent. In districts where the
minority party ran a candidate three or more times the races
8
were usually closer.
Figure 1 shows the districts in which one party won every
election and had opposition less than three times. A comparison
with Figure 2 shows that these extreme one-party areas include
most of those traditionally monopolized by one party in the
presidential voting. This is not surprising in a state with deeplyrooted voting habits. One nearly solid block of Democratic
counties lies in the western part of the state and the second is
in the northcentral part of the state, known as the outer bluegrass
section. The major Republican-controlled counties are in the
southern and southeastern areas of the state, excluding the major
coal-mining counties stretched out along the southeastern border
from Bell to Pike. Although none of these districts in which
one party usually runs unopposed is in a metropolitan area, they
are not exclusively rural. If the 80 non-metropolitan districts
were ranked according to their percentage of urban population,
the most extreme one-party districts would be widely distributed
among them although with somewhat more among the most rural
districts.
Most of the 25 two-party districts are found in three areas
of the states. Six are in the narrow band of counties running
from west to east in the center of the state. This is the neutral
territory roughly separating heavily Republican and heavily
8 The elections of 1943 and 1945, in which the Republicans won unusually
high numbers of seats (44 and 31), provided additional evidence concerning
competition in these districts. The Republicans won eleven seats in 1943 and
eight seats in 1945 among those thirteen districts with turnover during the
1947-1957 period. They won eight seats in 1943 and four seats in 1945 among
the nine seats in which the Republicans always ran a candidate during the later
period though never winning. The Republicans won five seats in 1943 and only
one in 1945 among the 59 districts where the Party never won and did not
always run candidates in the 1947-1957 period.
9This is not the place to trace in detail the historical background of voting
patterns in Kentucky. This is well covered in Fenton, Politics in the Border
States 14-81 (1957).
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Democratic counties. In several of these districts party turnover has resulted only from sharp primary contests in the majority party. Five more two-party districts are in the southeastern coal-mining area, in counties that used to be solidly
Republican but have voted Democratic in presidential elections
since the New Deal era. Both parties almost always had candidates in the legislative races; the winner seldom got over 60
percent of the vote, and there was frequent party turnover.
The third area is Jefferson County, the major metropolitan county
and the site of Louisville. In all eleven Jefferson County districts
both parties ran candidates at every election, and in three of
these there was some party turnover. The three remaining
two-party districts are in one-party sections of the state. One
is in a metropolitan county, one elected a minority party candidate as a result of a closely-contested majority party primary,
and one is a district combining a strongly Republican and a
strongly Democratic county (a factor contributing to close competition in several other districts).
It is clear that metropolitanism is the major feature producing close and persistent competition between the two parties.
Only the coal counties, undergoing a transformation of political
affiliation, can match Jefferson County in party competition.
There are nine legislative districts outside Jefferson County that
are in areas classified as metropolitan by the Census Bureau.
Although only one had two-party contests in every election, these
districts ranked well above average in competition. In 60 per cent
of the metropolitan districts there was either two-party competition in every election or some party turnover over the twelveyear period. The comparable figure for the non-metropolitan
districts was 16 per cent.
The high proportion of two-party districts in metropolitan
areas is clearly indicated; it corresponds with similar findings
in a study of the Ohio legislature. 10 The reason is not so readily
apparent. There are some features of metropolitan life that probably help party competition. Large cities have a greater variety
10 Thtstudy, while using slightly different standards of measurement, showed
that metropolitan districts had much more competition than non-metropolitan
ones; among the latter a higher degree of urbanism usually produced- more
competition. In Ohio also the geograpc pattern of party concentration made
it difficult to measure how much of this competition was due to urbanism itself
and how much to political factors. Eulau, "The Ecological Basis of Party
Systems: The Case of Ohio," 1 Midwest J. of Pol. Sc. 125-35 (1957).
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of social and economic classes, greater population mobility, and
fewer traditional voting habits; in small towns there is more
frequent pressure to conform to the dominant political philosophy." In the large city greater resources of finance and personnel are likely to be available to the party organizations. Moreover, the large numbers of votes at stake for national and statewide elections provide party organizations with incentive to
present a full ticket of local candidates in order to stimulate
voting.
Some of the reasons may be unique in Kentucky, where
Democratic strength is based less on metropolitan areas and Republican strength less on rural areas and small towns than in most
northeastern and midwestern states. While Democratic votes
are widely scattered, Republican strength is limited to certain
traditional counties already described and to the suburbs of the
metropolitan areas. 2 The five metropolitan counties provided
almost two-thirds of President Eisenhower's 96,000 plurality in
Kentucky in 1956; Jefferson County alone provided over onethird of it. 3 In this normally Democratic state the greatest cause
of non-competitive districts is the shortage of Republican voters.
It is not surprising that today there is a high proportion of twoparty districts in metropolitan counties, particularly Jefferson. 14
Despite the fact that all the metropolitan counties produced
pluralities or near-pluralities for Eisenhower in both 1952 and
1956, the Republicans have sometimes failed to run candidates
in metropolitan counties other than Jefferson, and those that ran
have sometimes been badly defeated. The system of off-year
elections used in Kentucky, a Republican asset in New Deal
days, has recently handicapped the party, which has been unable to take full advantage of Eisenhower's victories.' 5 National
1Id. at 126-27.

12 See Fenton, op. cit. Supra note 9, at 72-74, 78-81, for a brief discussion
of suburban trends.
13 Kentucky Government Directory 64-69 (1958).
14 At the height of Republican legislative success, in 1943, the Republicans
won nine of the eleven Jefferson County seats, and three of the other nine
metropolitan seats.
15 See Key, op. cit., Supra note 6, at 41-49, for a discussion of the handicap
to a minority party in any state where gubernatorial elections are scheduled in
nonpresidential years. The minority may escape one-sided losses when the other
party is winning nationally but it never gets the direct assistance from a national
victory that would help it to capture the governorship. Kentucky, one of the
four states holding legislative elections in neither presidential nor congressional
election years, makes a Republican victory in either the legislative or the gubernatorial races particularly difficult.
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trends do appear to have had an effect on the Republican party's
enthusiasm for running candidates. It ran the most candidates
for the House (64) the year after the 1946 Republican congressional victory. After the Eisenhower victories, it ran 59 in 1952
and 52 in 1956. Other years the number varied from 47 to 51.
Although the party did not regularly run more candidates in
years of gubernatorial races, it did so in 1947 probably because
the incumbent was a Republican. The Democrats have varied
less in the number of legislative candidates but have run more
in the years the Republicans have run fewer; the parties seem
to read the same crystal ball.
PBDARxY COMPTITION

If over half of Kentucky legislative elections are not contested by both parties and only a few districts have any party
turnover, it becomes important to test whether primary elections
in the majority party are an adequate substitute for elections.
To serve this function, primaries must be frequently held in
districts with little two-party competition, they must be reasonably competitive, and they must at least occasionally present
the voter with a choice of issues and records, not merely candidates. As a first step, it is necessary to discover how frequently primaries are held and what factors stimulate primary
competition.
Table 1 shows in broad outline the extent of primary competition. Even if the races in which a party ran no candidate
are excluded, the Democrats have a higher proportion of contested primaries and close contests than do the Republicans.
TABLE 1
CONTESTS IN PRIMARY ELECTIONS FOR KENTUCKY HOUSE

OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1947-1957
Degree of
Primary Competition

Democratic Primary
No.
0

Republican Primary
%
No.

Contests in which Winner

Received Under 60%
Contests in which Winner
Received 60% or More
Only One Candidate
in Primary

No Candidate in Primary

199

33

85

14

120

20

64

11

204

34

174

29

77

13

2770

46

* There were 280 elections without any Republican candidate because three Republicans
who won primary contests withdrew before the election and were not replaced.
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Studies in other states have shown that legislative primary
competition is greater when the prospects of victory are higher.
Presumably, in districts where one party usually wins, there will
be a maximum amount of competition for the majority party
nomination, which usually is tantamount to election. In close
districts there may be considerable competition in the primaries
of both parties, but it may be tempered at times by the desire to
avoid divisive intra-party contests that might cause an election
defeat. In districts where one party usually wins, there will be
a minimum of competition for the minority party nomination;

in fact, it may be difficult to find any candidate to run in the
election."6
Logical though it appears, this hypothesis needs to be tested
against the facts in Kentucky. Most of the states examined in
other studies have been characterized by closer party competition
than exists in Kentucky. Moreover, one-party districts might
be thought to have certain characteristics, such as low percentage of urban population, that could affect primary competition.
The effect of election prospects on primary competition can be
measured better in districts over the twelve-year period than in
individual races. Potential primary candidates will presumably
be influenced more by the recent record of the district than
by the unpredictable November election returns.
In Table 2 the districts have been divided into categories
using the same measure of party competition referred to previously. The districts are arranged to run in order from the winning party in the most one-sided districts, through both parties
in the closest districts to the losing party in the one-sided districts.lT

In general the table shows the expected results. Competition is most likely in the primaries of the winning party in those
districts with no party turnover and without consistent two16See Key, op. sit., Supra note 6, at 171-80, for an elaboration of this
hypothesis and examples from Missouri, Indiana, and Ohio. Similar conclusions
about the relationship between election prospects and primary competition in
Wisconsin are found in Epstein, Politics in Wisconsin 130-85, 200-01 (1958).
Both Key and Epstein found that in the states they studied primary competition,
though rising steadily as a party's electoral chances increased, fell somewhat
for the majority party in those districts that were most onesided. This particular
feature is not evident in Kentucky, which has a higher proportion of one-sided
districts than the other states studied.
17 Since primaries in which a party ran no candidate are excluded there
are of course no figures given in Table 2 for minority primary contests in districts
where the majority always won without opposition.
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party contests. Within this group, primary contests are somewhat closer but not more frequent in those districts with more
frequent election opposition.
TABLE 2
PRIMARY CONTESTS IN KENTUCKY HOUSE DISTRICTS HAVING
VARYING DEGREES OF TWO-PARTY COMPETITION, 1947-1957

Degree of Party Competition

Party

29 Districts which Never
Had Party Competition Winner
26 Districts with Party
Competition 1 or 2 Times Winner
20 Districts with Party ComWinner
petition ,4, or 5 Times
12 Districts which Always
Had Party Competition Winner
13 Districts which Had
Party Turnover
Both
12 Districts which Always
Had Party Competition Loser
20 Districts with Party ComLoser
petition 3, 4, or 5 Times
26 Districts with Party
Competition 1 or 2 Times Loser

Contests
Contests
with Winner with Winner
Under 60% 60% or More

Only
One
Candidate

52%

15%

33%

46

26

28

44

26

s0

21

32

47

31

27

42

6

25

69

7

6

87

3

3

94

A moderate amount of primary competition, producing contests in more than half of the cases, occurred in the winning party
when it always had election competition and in both parties in
districts with turnover. The least competition occurred in
minority-party primaries in districts without party turnover. Even
though contests with no candidate are excluded, the degree of
minority-party competition declines rapidly at the bottom of
the table. In districts where the minority cannot consistently
produce a candidate there is rarely any primary contest.
A breakdown of the figures in Table 2 shows little differences
between Republican and Democratic practices, with one exception. In the districts that were safe for each party, the Republicans were somewhat more likely to have primary competition
than were the Democrats.'8
1s A study of primary competition in legislative and prosecuting attorney
contests in Indiana over a thirty-year period led to the same conclusion: that
the party which is stronger on a statewide basis has fewer primary contests in
its safe areas than the weaker party has in its safe districts. Standing & Robinson,
"Inter-Party Competition and Primary Contesting: The Case of Indiana," 52
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1077 (1958).
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Although the relationship between primary competition and
the prospects for electoral victory appears to be both logical and
statistically obvious, it is necessary to consider other factors
that might influence primary competition. A likely one is the
question of incumbency. It seems possible that there would
be less primary competition when the incumbent was seeking
renomination. Studies made in a few other states have led to
conflicting conclusions about the significance of incumbency. 9
Since the frequency with which incumbents seek renomination
might be affected by the prospects of electoral victory, it is necessary to keep the latter factor constant while varying the former.
In Kentucky incumbency seems to have a minor effect in discouraging primary competition, if electoral prospects are kept
constant. In the 75 one-party districts, there were contests in
69 per cent of the majority-party primaries with an incumbent
running; when there was no incumbent the figure was 70 per
cent. There is somewhat more difference in two-party districts.
Including the winning party in 12 districts with consistent twoparty competition and both parties in the 18 districts with turnover, there were contests 53 per cent of the time with incumbents
and 58 per cent of the time without them. These differences
do not seem great enough to be significant. Oddly enough, in
the safe Republican districts, there was a slightly increased
chance of Republican primary competition when an incumbent
was running. In the more closely contested districts the figures
were the same for Democratic and Republican primaries. In
the districts always won by the Democrats there were incumbents running in 57 per cent of the majority-party primaries;
in Republican districts the figure was only 42 per cent. Presumably the Republican candidates had less incentive to seek
an extended career in the legislature.
There are about ten two-county districts in which the legislative seat appears to be rotated between the two counties at
each election. This practice does not reduce the likelihood of
primary competition in the absence of an incumbent in the pri19 Key found that in Missouri and Ohio the presence of an incumbent in
a primary was likely to decrease the chances of opposition particularly in safe

districts. He thought this might help to cause the drop in majority party primary
competition that he found in the safest districts. Key, op. cit. supra note 6, at

175-177. Epstein found no consistent relationship between incumbency and primary competition. Epstein, op. cit. upra note 16, at 131-132, 200.
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mary, however; all of these districts had majority-party primary
contests at least three times and usually more frequently. The
practice is limited to districts that have been consistently controlled by one party. Half of these districts are Republican, a
disproportionately high number.
Another question that must be measured is the effect of
urbanism on primary competition. Studies of other states have
shown that primary competition is greater in the more highlyurbanized districts?20 As in the survey of incumbency it is necessary to keep the factor of election prospects constant while varying the urbanization factor. Table 3 shows that among Kentucky
two-party districts primary contests are much more frequent and
are closer in the thirteen non-metropolitan districts than in the
twelve metropolitan districts. Among the non-metropolitan districts, variations in the percentage of urban population do not
seem to affect the chances for a primary contest although it is
less likely to be a close one in districts that are at least 25 per cent
urban. (There are not enough two-party, non-metropolitan districts to make these comparisons particularly significant, however.) Among the 75 one-party districts, the degree of urbanization appears to have remarkably little effect on primary competition in the majority party. Close primary contests are least
likely in the metropolitan districts, but the contrast with nonmetropolitan districts is much less than in two-party areas.
Is this situation caused by factors that are unique to Kentucky? V. 0. Key thought there was less primary competition
in the rural districts of the states he studied because less effort
and fewer resources were necessary to monopolize party position than in large urban areas characterized by a multiplicity
of power centers.2' The political situation is different in Kentucky, where two-party competition is concentrated to such a
degree in metropolitan areas. It is primarily in the metropolitan
areas that the minority party (usually Republican) has the re20
Key divided districts into those with a population over fifty per cent
urban and those under fifty per cent urban. He found primary contests twice
as frequent in the former districts than in the latter in Ohio, while in Missouri
the more urban districts bad five times as high a proportion of primary contest9
as the more rural districts. He thought that if the most one-sided districts were
rural ones this factor would also contribute to the slight drop in primary competition in one-sided districts that he noted. Key, op. cit. supra note 6, at 175178. Epstein's findings were similar in Wisconsin. Epstein, op. cit. supra note 16,
at 133.
2
Key, op. cit. supra note 6, at 178.
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sources and the incentive to offer vigorous opposition and to
present candidates regularly. Under these conditions, both parties
in metropolitan areas have relatively strong organizations that
seek to avoid primary contests. Moreover, the metropolitan
Democratic organizations have greater patronage to utilize
than those in the smaller counties. Most of the one-party districts in Kentucky are so one-sided that the majority party organization lacks the incentive to maintain unity. Just as the
majority party in a one-party southern state has neither the
need nor the ability to avoid statewide primary contests, so
TABLE 3

PRIMARY CONTESTS IN KENTUCKY HOUSE DISTRICTS HAVING
VARYING DEGREES OF TWO-PARTY COMPETITION AND
VARYING PERCENTAGES OF URBAN POPULATION,
1947-1957*
% of District
Population Living
in Urban Areas

No. of
Districts

75-100
25-74
1-24
0

12
3
7
3

75-100
25-74
1-24
0

8
23
19
25

Contests
Contests
with Winner
with Winner
Under 60%
60 % or More
Two-Party Districts
10%
80%
34V
31
47
23
28
88
One-Party Districts
42
27
51
22
47
21
47
20

Only
One
Candidate
60%
34/
30
34
31
27
32
33

0 Two-party districts include those with party turnover, for which the records of both
parties are given, and those in which both parties always ran candidates, for which only the
record of the majority party is included because the minority party in those districts had
much less primary competition. (Note Table 2.) One-party districts are all those in which
there was no party turnover and the minority party did not always run a candidate. Only
the record of the majority party is included in these districts. The twenty districts that are at
least 75 per cent urban happen to be the only ones in areas defined by the Census Bureau
as metropolitan.

the majority party in Kentucky's one-party districts usually fails
to prevent primary contests.
The situation will be clarified if the primaries of the two
parties are compared. Among the 25 two-party districts the Republicans have even less primary competition than the Democrats in the metropolitan districts (primarily in Jefferson County).
These are the areas where the Republican party, which normally
has a large minority or a small majority of the vote, has a particularly strong incentive for maintaining unity and has a rela-
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tively effective organization. In the non-metropolitan areas there
is little difference between party practices.
Among the 75 one-party districts, there are eight in metropolitan areas, all Democratic. In all of these metropolitan districts
the Republicans have run candidates on occasion, with the
median being three elections out of six. Moreover, these are
all in counties which gave President Eisenhower a majority
or near-majority in the last two presidential elections. Consequently in the eight metropolitan districts the Democrats might
be expected to have both the organization and the incentive
necessary for avoiding close primary contests. Among the nonmetropolitan Democratic districts there is more primary competition in completely rural districts than in those with some
urban population. Among the Republican districts, however,
there is a striking degree of competition (a primary contested
and won by less than 60 per cent in 81 out of the 36 elections)
in the six districts having some urban population. These districts
are not heavily urban, however, and there are too few to permit
valid generalizations.
In Kentucky, where the majority Democratic party is frequently torn by state-wide factional conflicts, it is important to
inquire whether such factionalism affects Democratic legislative primaries. While statistical proof is lacking, press accounts
suggest that when Democratic state-wide factional conflicts
were most intense contests in the Democratic legislative primary
increased and more often reflected the statewide conflict. Factional primary contests were particularly frequent in Jefferson County.2
n 1947 Earl Clements narrowly defeated Harry Lee Waterfield
in the Democratic guernatorial primary. Both factions endorsed
candidates for all or most of the contested seats in Jefferson
County, and pro-Clements candidates won six of these seven
contests. In 1949 press accounts identified candidates in nearly
half of the contested Democratic House primaries as either
administration or anti-administration men. Administration candidates won over half of these contests. In 1947 and 1949 the
total numbers of contested Democratic House primaries were
53 and 56 respectively. In the next two primaries the totals
22 This is based on a survey of the Louisville Courier-Journaland the Lexington Herald during the period of primaries in the years under study.
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dropped to 49 and 41. In 1951 Lawrence W. Wetherby, who defeated Howell W. Vincent by more than a three-to-one margin,
had the backing of most leaders of both Democratic factions
in the state. In 1951 and 1953 there was little evidence of factionalism in legislative contests. In 1955 and 1957 the total
number of Democratic contests rose to 61 and 59, respectively.
In 1955 A. B. Chandler narrowly defeated Bert Combs in the
gubernatorial primary, but press accounts reported factional
legislative contests only in Jefferson County. In 1957 there were
reports of factional contests for ten legislative seats, most of them
won by opponents of the Chandler administration.
An examination of factionalism also sheds light on the differences between Democratic primary competition in metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. The Jefferson County Democratic primary had contests in 26 out of 44 possible cases during the four elections when the press reported competing factional legislative sales in the county; there were contests in
only three out of 22 possible cases in the other two years. In
no other districts were there frequent reports of state-wide factional contests being reflected in the legislative primary. Almost
all of the other districts where there were any reports of this
happening were in metropolitan districts or safe Democratic
districts in the western part of the state.
This evidence suggests that the conclusions about the effects
of metropolitanism on Democratic primary competition can be
further refined. In Jefferson County the dominant faction of
the Democratic party, which is pro-Clements and anti-Chandler,
has both the resources and the incentive (from Republican
opposition) to maintain a strong organization and often to prevent serious primary opposition. It regularly endorses a legislative slate. Primary contests usually arise only when there
is a state-wide factional conflict that causes an opposing group
to present a slate of candidates in the county legislative races.
One reason the opponents file a slate is to give them representation in the county election machinery; this is especially important in such a large county. In other metropolitan areas
there is less organizational strength and less need for unity;
primary contests vary greatly in frequency but are not so dependent on an organized opposition slate. In the non-metro-
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politan Democratic districts, where politics is more personal,
factionalism seldom appears to be a factor in primary contests.
PMLAMs AS SuBsTrUs iFOR ELECTIONS

To what extent can primaries in the majority party be considered an adequate substitute for elections in the one-party areas
of Kentucky? In most districts there was some form of competition. The number of legislators chosen without either primary or election opposition varied from 13 to 24 and averaged
18 in the 1947-57 period. In an average year only two incumbents
were defeated in elections and four others retired before the
opposing party won the seat; by contrast, an average of eleven
incumbents were defeated in primaries, with the exact number
varying from six to thirteen.It has been established that primary competition was more
likely in the majority party in districts where victory in November was virtually certain; where there was closer party competition, there were fewer contests. This fact in itself guarantees that primaries will be a partial substitute for elections, providing more choice when the election is one-sided. In the 75
one-party districts during six elections there were primary contests in the majority party over two-thirds of the time and close
contests nearly half of the time.2 3 Among these districts there
were none in which the majority party never had a primary
contest and only one district with just a single contest. There
were six districts having primary contests twice, 24 with three
contests, nine with four contests, 18 with five contests, and 17
with contests every election year. Fourteen of these last 17
had at least one primary in which an incumbent was defeated,
a much higher proportion than in the other districts. The 29
districts in which one party never ran a candidate are obviously the ones where a primary was most needed. In just
four of these were primaries held only once or twice, while in
thirteen they were held five or six times.
If the primaries are to substitute for elections, contests must
not only be frequent and reasonably close but must also present
the voter with some real choice of issues and records. Even
though parties do not differ on every issue, there is usually
23 See Table 2.
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enough contrast between their platforms and between their
records to give the voter some meaningful choice in two-party
districts. In the primary of a one-party district, the high retirement rate minimizes the chances a citizen has of voting on the
records of state legislators. Among the 75 one-party districts,
the median district had an incumbent seeking re-election to the
House in only three out of the six primaries.2 4 Lacking an incumbent, the voters in a primary must make decisions on the
basis of personalities and promises rather than legislative records.
It is for this reason that the role of factionalism in legislative primaries assumes great importance. Democratic factionalism in legislative races is most frequently reported in the
two-party districts, particularly in Jefferson County. Press reports suggested factionalism in slightly less than half of the
fifty-five Democratic-dominated districts. But factionalism was
an intermittent factor, seldom occurring more than once in a
twelve-year period in any of these legislative districts. Even
though some local examples of factional conflict presumably
escaped the newspapers, it seems clear that the Democratic
voters outside Jefferson County seldom have a clear choice between candidates representing two different organized groups
each with a well-known program. The factions seem to have
lacked enough organizational strength throughout the legislative districts to provoke such contests. Moreover, in the
twenty districts dominated by the Republican party, voters in
the primary have had no major factions to choose between.
Voters in one-party districts, it appears, frequently have a choice
to make in legislative primaries, but the choice is seldom as meaningful as that in two-party districts.
CONCLusIoNs

An examination of Kentucky legislative races emphasizes
that, despite occasional Republican victories in statewide contests, Kentucky is a Democratic state. The weakness of twoparty competition is proved not only by the continuing Republican failure to win a legislative majority but also by the scarcity
of closeyl-contested House seats. Close contests are far more fre24 In addition, some House members were running for the Senate and some
former members of the House were seeking election; in both cases they would
have records that could be issues in the campaign.
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quent and incumbents are in much greater jeopardy in the primaries than in the general election. The greater the chance a
party has for electoral victory in a district, the more likely there
is to be primary competition for the nomination although there is
less primary competition in metropolitan areas, where party organizations are strong.
Despite frequent contests in the majority primary of oneparty districts, the primary does not serve as an adequate substitute for elections in making legislators responsible. It is unrealistic to expect the average voter to have adequate familiarity
with the voting record and program of legislative candidates.
He can make an intelligent choice related to issues and based
on more than personality only if he can identify the candidate
with some state-wide party or faction that has a record or a
platform. Democratic legislative candidates in the one-party
areas seldom appear to be closely identified with opposing statewide factions. Even when there is such identification, it may be
doubted whether the average voter is frequently aware of it
and whether state-wide factional issues will be reflected in the
legislative campaign. It is seldom that the Kentucky voter has
no choice of legislative candidates. But it is also seldom that
the average voter, in his choice of these candidates, can choose
between conflicting programs for state government.

